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Abstract
A standard assumption in the literature of strategic voting is the independence of signals. Each
juror observes a signal at the interim stage of the game. Then she votes according to her private
information in order to maximize her expected utility. This work introduces a dependency between
signals, reﬂecting a more realistic situation, in which evidences can be incontrovertible. We give a
full characterization of the symmetric equilibria in non-weakly dominated strategies and we provide a
benchmark between the classical approach and this new one.
Jel Classification: C72, D72
1 Introduction
The problem of the jury, how jurors vote and when a collective choice is better than an individual one has
been object of study in political science and in statistics for a long time. Starting from Condorcet's famous
Theorem (1785), that can be stated as under the majority rule, groups of people make better decisions than
single individuals and large electorates adopt the correct decision with very high probability, many scholars
extended this result using more relaxed statistical assumptions. The main argument is that each juror has a
probability p ∈ ( 12 , 1) of choosing the correct option and she wants to do it. Through a proper aggregation
method of the votes the statement holds. The value of p depends on the qualities of the individuals, i.e.
their knowledge of the debated matter or the understanding of the consequences. The aggregation method
depends on the type of institution considered. Despite the eﬀorts to enrich the model, i.e. introducing the
dependency of the probabilities (see, among others, Boland, 1989; Berg, 1993; Ladha, 1995, 1997; Berend
and Sapir, 2007) or adding heterogeneity in the chance of making the correct choice (Boland, 1989), all
these approaches consider jurors as if they were committed to vote informatively. There is no room for any
other type of evaluation, rather than the statistical structure. So the implicit assumption is that each juror
behaves as if she was alone. Even if she knows that the ﬁnal outcome does not depend uniquely by her
choice. This contradicts the notion of rationality. For this reason this subject has been analyzed also from
the game theoretic point of view. The basic assumption is that, even if jurors share the same objective,
they vote strategically in order to maximize their expected utility. The probabilities of making the correct
choice, which incorporates information acquisition, competence and understanding of the debated matter
are replaced with the observation of noisy signals. The framework becomes a classical setting of games
with private information. The incentive to look for the maximization of the expected utility comes from
the information-based heterogeneity of individuals at the interim stage of the game. This approach gives
some insights about the jurors' behavior (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996), explains the participation rate,
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the roll-oﬀ eﬀect, the information disclosure in large elections (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996, 1997)
and the robustness of the aggregation methods (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998). Moreover, Myerson
(1998) shows that the Condorcet's Jury Theorem holds also with strategic individuals when the number
of participants and the correct option are uncertain. This article analyzes the strategic behavior of a
jury that must vote to acquit or convict a defendant during a trial. The situation is similar to a group
of experts who must choose through a poll, to approve or reject a project. The main issue is that the
truth is unknown. Before making her choice, each juror observes a signal that gives an indication about
the innocence or the guiltiness of the defendant or the quality of the project. In the statistical approach,
as in the game theoretic one, signals are assumed to be independent. The underlying hypothesis is that
jurors interpret evidences diﬀerently, because of their diﬀerent life experiences and competencies. This
assumption is convenient because it makes computation easier. But, if we interpret signals as evidences
or as a technical report, there are at least two possible implications: jurors are allowed to interpret them
in opposite ways or during the trial no decisive evidence is produced at all. For this reason in our analysis
we assume that, with a positive probability α ∈ (0, 1) evidences are so strong to leave no chance to
interpretation. In fact, if we consider the modern investigation techniques, i.e. ﬁngerprints, DNA or some
particular circumstances, such as digital recordings or being caught in the act, the independence of signals
does not seem reasonable. Following the results in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) we will restrict our
attention to simple majority decision rules with no abstention. The remainder of the chapter is organized
as follows: in section 2.2 we present the model. In section 2.3 we compute the symmetric equilibria. In
section 2.4 we summarize the classical model with independent signals and we compute the corresponding
symmetric equilibria. In section 2.5 we compare the two models trying to ﬁnd a benchmark. Section 2.6
concludes. All the proofs are in the Appendix (Section 2.7).
2 The Model
Let J be the set of jurors with odd cardinality, each j ∈ J must choose to acquit or convict the defendant.
There is no abstention so the action set for each juror is Sj = {a, c}, moreover jurors share the same payoﬀ
function vj = v : Ω1 × S→ R, deﬁned as
v , u ◦ f
where Ω1 = {I,G} is the set of states of Nature, innocent or guilty, concerning the defendant. The set
S = Sj ×S−j is the set of all possible action proﬁles. The function v is the composition of the aggregation
rule f : Sj × S−j → {a, c} of the action proﬁles with the utility function u : {a, c} × Ω1 → R, deﬁned as
u(a|ω1 = I) = u(c|ω1 = G) = 0
u(a|ω1 = G) = −(1− q)
u(c|ω1 = I) = −q
with q ∈ (0, 1). The parameter q can be viewed as a threshold of reasonable doubt. The true state in Ω1
is unknown and the jury members share the same prior probability distribution pij = pi = Pr(I) ∈ (0, 1).
Before choosing an action in Sj each juror j ∈ J observes a private signal tj that can assume values in
Tj = {i, g} with state dependent distribution. In particular, with probability α ∈ (0, 1) nature reveals the
true state in Ω1 with degenerate independent signals
Pr(tj = i|I,R) = 1 and Pr(tj = g|G,R) = 1
Pr(tj = g|I,R) = 0 and Pr(tj = i|G,R) = 0
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where R is the event degenerate signals and with probability (1 − α) signals are still independent but
not so accurate
Pr(tj = i|I,¬R) = z and Pr(tj = g|G,¬R) = z
Pr(tj = g|I,¬R) = 1− z and Pr(tj = i|G,¬R) = 1− z
with z ∈ ( 12 , 1). To summarize the set of states of nature is deﬁned as Ω = Ω1 × Ω2 where Ω2 = {R,¬R}
contains the event degenerate signals and its complement. The event R is not directly observable and so
Pr(tj = g|G) = α+ (1− α)z
Pr(tj = i|G) = (1− α)(1− z)
Pr(tj = i|I) = α+ (1− α)z
Pr(tj = g|I) = (1− α)(1− z)
After getting her signal, each juror j ∈ J updates her belief using Bayes' rule and then
Pr(I|tj = i) = αpi + (1− α)piz
αpi + (1− α)[piz + (1− pi)(1− z)]
Pr(I|tj = g) = (1− α)pi(1− z)
α(1− pi) + (1− α)[pi(1− z) + (1− pi)z]
Pr(G|tj = i) = (1− α)(1− pi)(1− z)
αpi + (1− α)[piz + (1− pi)(1− z)]
Pr(G|tj = g) = α(1− pi) + (1− α)(1− pi)z
α(1− pi) + (1− α)[pi(1− z) + (1− pi)z]
the sets (Sj , Tj)j∈J and the values of |J |, α, z, pi, q are common knowledge. Each juror votes simultaneously
and before the poll they cannot communicate. This assumption could seem too strong but the analysis
of the deliberation mechanism is beyond the purpose of this work. Let 0 ≤ k(s) ≤ |J | be the number of
acquit votes in an action proﬁle s ∈ S and let mˆ be equal to mˆ = (|J | − 1)/21. The aggregating rule f
used is deﬁned as
f(s) ,
{
a if k(s) > mˆ
c if k(s) ≤ mˆ
and it corresponds to simple majority. This type of function has two important properties, it is anonymous
and monotonic: it treats all votes equally and if a decision is taken with n votes, it will not change with
n+ 1 votes. The presence of private signals and the interdependence of the payoﬀ functions, induce each
juror to vote strategically.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A voting strategy for juror j ∈ J is a map
σj : Tj → ∆(Sj)
where ∆(Sj) ⊃ Sj is the set of all possible pure and mixed actions.
Following the terminology in Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) each juror can behave in three diﬀerent ways
Deﬁnition 2.2. A voting strategy σj : Tj → ∆(Sj) is
i. informative, if σj(sj |tj = i) = a and σj(sj |tj = g) = c.
ii. sincere, if given the observed signal, it maximizes the expected utility of juror j ∈ J .
Let σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σ2mˆ+1) be the voting strategy proﬁle of the jury, then
1Since |J | is assumed to be an odd number, mˆ is always an integer.
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Deﬁnition 2.3. A voting strategy proﬁle σ : {i, g}2mˆ+1 → {∆(Sj)}2mˆ+1j=1 is rational, if it is a bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the game Γb = 〈J, (Tj , Sj)j∈J , (α, z, pi), v〉.
Deﬁnition 2.4. The voting strategy proﬁle σ∗ = (σ∗1 , . . . , σ
∗
2mˆ+1) is a bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
game Γb = 〈J, (Tj , Sj)j∈J , (α, z, pi), v〉 if for all j ∈ J , tj ∈ Tj and σj ∈ ∆(Sj)∑
t−j∈T−j
v(σ∗j |σ∗−j , tj , t−j) Pr(t−j |tj) ≥
∑
t−j∈T−j
v(σj |σ∗−j , tj , t−j) Pr(t−j |tj)
Corollary 2.5. Whenever a voting strategy proﬁle σ∗ is rational, it is also sincere.
It is well known that a rational juror is concerned only when her vote is pivotal. In particular for this
model, after observing tj = g juror j ∈ J prefers to acquit if q > Pr(G|piv, tj = g) or convict if the
inequality is reversed. In the same way, after observing tj = i she prefers to acquit if q > Pr(G|piv, tj = i)
or convict if the inequality is reversed. The probability that a defendant is guilty, given that juror j ∈ J
is pivotal and given tj = g can be computed as
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = Pr(G|tj = g) Pr(piv|G, tj = g)
Pr(G|tj = g) Pr(piv|G, tj = g) + Pr(I|tj = g) Pr(piv|I, tj = g)
where
Pr(piv|G, tj = g) =
∑
t−j∈T−j
Pr(t−j |G, tj = g) Pr(piv|G, t−j , tj = g)
Pr(piv|I, tj = g) =
∑
t−j∈T−j
Pr(t−j |I, tj = g) Pr(piv|I, t−j , tj = g)
and it depends on the distribution of the signals proﬁle and on the strategies adopted by the jurors. The
probabilities Pr(G|piv, tj = i), Pr(I|piv, tj = g) and Pr(I|piv, tj = i) are similarly deﬁned.
3 Equilibria
In this paper we will analyze only the symmetric bayesian Nash equilibria in which players do not use
weakly dominated strategies. From now on assume |J | = 3. To avoid trivial cases the parameter q ∈ (0, 1)
must be restricted. In fact, let us assume that a single juror can observe all signals and she observes the
signals proﬁle t = (g, g, g). In this case, if she chooses to acquit irrespectively of the observed proﬁle, it
means that she is not responsive as if she chooses to convict after observing the signals proﬁle t = (i, i, i).
Deﬁnition 3.1. A juror j ∈ J is said to be responsive, if there exist at least two signals proﬁles t′, t′′ ∈ T
such that σj(sj |t = t′) 6= σj(sj |t = t′′) for some sj ∈ Sj, where T = {Tj}2mˆ+1j=1 .
This deﬁnition is similar to the one in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998). Before observing the signal,
each juror has a prior probability distribution pi ∈ (0, 1) and it represents the common sentiment about
the innocence or the guiltiness of the defendant. It seems natural to study the behavior of equilibrated
jurors who have not a biased opinion.
Deﬁnition 3.2. A juror j ∈ J is said to be unbiased, if pi = 12 .
The above deﬁnition characterizes an impartial juror.
Proposition 3.3. For given α ∈ (0, 1), z ∈ ( 12 , 1) and |T | = 3, an unbiased juror j ∈ J is responsive, if
and only if
q ∈ (qminα , qmaxα ) = ( (1− α)(1− z)3α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3] , α+ (1− α)z3α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]
)
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The above proposition gives the boundaries within the parameter q must lie, with a little abuse of notation
it is possible to consider σj(sj |tj = g) as the probability of acquit given the signal tj = g and σj(sj |tj = i)
as the probability of acquit given the signal tj = i. As it will be clear below, the value of q determines the
feasible strategies and the equilibria. The following proposition describes when the informative strategy
is also rational.
Proposition 3.4. Let J be a set of unbiased and responsive jurors with mˆ ∈ N <∞ for given α ∈ (0, 1)
and z ∈ ( 12 , 1), if q ∈ (1 − z, z) then the informative voting strategy (proﬁle) is rational. That is, for any
q ∈ (1− z, z) the informative voting strategy proﬁle σ∗ is a bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γb.
Notice that the above proposition holds for any ﬁnite mˆ. When q /∈ (1− z, z) the threshold of reasonable
doubt is shifted toward a behavior more concerned about the risk of make a mistake. In particular, for
q ∈ (qminα , 1− z) jurors are more afraid of acquit a guilty, rather than convict an innocent defendant. The
following proposition describes the symmetric bayesian Nash equilibrium played by this type of jurors.
Proposition 3.5. Let J be a set of unbiased and responsive jurors with |J | = 3, for given α ∈ (0, 1),
z ∈ ( 12 , 1) and q ∈ (qˆminα , 1− z) the voting strategy
Pr(a|tj = g) = 0
Pr(a|tj = i) = q[α+ (1− α)[z
2 + (1− z)2]]− (1− α)(1− z)2
q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]]− (1− α)(1− z)3
where
qˆminα =
(1− α)(1− z)2
α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2] > q
min
α
is rational. That is, for any q ∈ (qˆminα , 1− z) the above strategy is a bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γb.
Notice that the lower bound in order to have an unbiased, responsive and rational juror is higher than
the one when there is only one decision maker. In a certain sense, it is as if the presence of other jurors
narrows the responsiveness interval. Moreover, jurors choose to accept the observed signal only when it
is consistent with their aptitude, and so they truthfully reveal it through the vote. In the other case they
prefer to randomize their vote. When q ∈ (z, qmaxα ) the situation is the opposite, jurors are more afraid of
convict a possible innocent rather than to acquit a guilty defendant.
Proposition 3.6. Let J be a set of unbiased and responsive jurors with |J | = 3, for given α ∈ (0, 1),
z ∈ ( 12 , 1) and q ∈ (z, qˆmaxα ) the voting strategy
Pr(a|tj = g) = q(1− α)z(1− z)− (1− α)z
2(1− z)
α+ (1− α)z3 − q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]]
Pr(a|tj = i) = 1
where
qˆmaxα =
α+ (1− α)z2
α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2] < q
max
α
is rational. That is, for any q ∈ (z, qˆmaxα ) the above strategy is a bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γb.
As in the previous proposition, the upper bound changes qˆmaxα < q
max
α and jurors accept to reveal
truthfully the signal only when it is coherent with their concern, otherwise they choose to randomize.
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Asymptotic Behavior
The Condorcet's Jury Theorem states that majority are more likely to select the correct alternative with
respect to the single one. Not only, when the number of jurors grows, the probability of making the correct
choice increases. Under the informative strategy a defendant is acquitted if and only if k(t) > mˆ, where
k(t) is the number of i signals in the proﬁle t ∈ T . The distribution of k(t) conditioned to one of the two
states in Ω1 is
Pr(k(t) = 2mˆ+ 1|ω1 = I) = α+ (1− α)z2mˆ+1
Pr(k(t) = x|ω1 = I) =
(
2mˆ+ 1
x
)
(1− α)zx(1− z)(2mˆ+1)−x
for 0 ≤ x < |J | = 2mˆ+ 1 and
Pr(k(t) = 0|ω1 = G) = α+ (1− α)z2mˆ+1
Pr(k(t) = x|ω1 = G) =
(
2mˆ+ 1
x
)
(1− α)z(2mˆ+1)−x(1− z)x
for 0 < x ≤ |J | = 2mˆ+ 1. So the probability of convict an innocent is
Pr(conv|I) = (1− α)
mˆ∑
x=0
(
2mˆ+ 1
x
)
zx(1− z)(2mˆ+1)−x
and the probability of acquit a guilty is
Pr(acq|G) = (1− α)
mˆ∑
x=0
(
2mˆ+ 1
x
)
zx(1− z)(2mˆ+1)−x
The following proposition shows that with the informative strategy the Condorcet's Theorem still holds.
Proposition 3.7. Let J be a set of unbiased, rational and responsive jurors with mˆ ∈ N, for given
α ∈ (0, 1), z ∈ ( 12 , 1) and q ∈ (1− z, z) the probability of convict an innocent and the probability of acquit
a guilty go to zero as the jury size goes to inﬁnity.
Single Judge vs. Multiple Jurors
In this part we analyze the situation in which there is only one judge, who must choose to acquit or convict
the defendant. The basic assumption made is that, since a judge can interact with the involved parties
he can get a more clear exposition of the evidences. For this reason we assume that he can extract more
information with respect to a single juror. Another possible justiﬁcation to this assumption is that judges
usually are more competent, than a single juror drawn from a list of common people. In order to keep
some analogies with the case of three jurors, we assume that the number of observed signals is equal to 3.
We compare the probabilities of making the correct choice for the same value of q. We maintain the same
utility function u, but in this case the aggregation rule f is simply the identity from the judge's decision
to the ﬁnal outcome for the defendant. Obviously, in this case, the probability of being pivotal is one. The
judge's behavior is the same as the single juror. He chooses to acquit if and only if q > Pr(G|tˆ), where
tˆ ∈ T is the observed signals proﬁle, otherwise he chooses to convict the defendant. Assuming that the
judge is not biased, let us compute the probabilities of being guilty given the diﬀerent signals proﬁles
Pr(G|g, g, g) = α+ (1− α)z
3
α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3] = θ1 Pr(G|i, g, g) = z = θ2
Pr(G|i, i, g) = 1− z = θ3 Pr(G|i, i, i) = (1− α)(1− z)
3
α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3] = θ4
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notice that θ2 and θ3 are the same independently of the permutation of the signals. Proposition 3.3 gives
us the interval of responsiveness for a single decision maker, we can see that θ1 = q
max
α and θ4 = q
min
α . Let
Pr(G|conv) be the probability that a guilty is convicted by a judge and let Pr(G|conv) the corresponding
probability when the deliberation is made by a group of jurors. When q ∈ (0, qminα ) both judge and jurors
are outside the responsiveness interval, and they always choose to convict the defendant.
Pr(G|conv) = 1
2
= Pr(G|conv)
It is easy to see that in this case, the probability of acquitting an innocent defendant is Pr(I|acq) = 0 =
Pr(I|acq). For q ∈ (qminα , qˆminα ) jurors always choose to convict the defendant, while the single judge will
acquit the defendant if and only if he observers the signal proﬁle t = (i, i, i). Hence
Pr(G|conv) = α+ (1− α)[z
3 + 3z(1− z)]
1 + 3(1− α)z(1− z) >
1
2
= Pr(G|conv)
since α + (1 − α)[z3 − (1 − z)3] > 0 holds for any α > 0 and z ∈ ( 12 , 1) the above inequality is always
satisﬁed. The probability of acquitting an innocent defendant, in this case is
Pr(I|acq) = α+ (1− α)z
3
α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3] > 0 = Pr(I|acq)
when q ∈ (1− z, z) the probabilities of convict a guilty defendant are the same
Pr(G|conv) = α+ (1− α)[z3 + 3z2(1− z)] = Pr(G|conv)
as the probabilities of acquitting an innocent one
Pr(I|acq) = α+ (1− α)[z3 + 3z2(1− z)] = Pr(I|acq)
For q ∈ (qˆmaxα , qmaxα ) jury members always choose to acquit a defendant, while a single juror will convict
when he observes the signal proﬁle t = (g, g, g). The corresponding probabilities are
Pr(G|conv) = α+ (1− α)z
3
α+ (1− alpha)[z3 + (1− z)3 > 0 = Pr(G|conv)
while for the probabilities of acquitting an innocent defendant the result is similar as the ﬁrst case analyzed
Pr(I|acq) = α+ (1− α)[z
3 + 3z(1− z)]
1 + 3(1− α)z(1− z) >
1
2
= Pr(I|acq)
For q ∈ (qmaxα , 1) both judge and jurors choose to acquit the defendant, the probabilities of convicting a
guilty defendant are zero and the probabilities of acquitting an innocent one are equal to one half.
4 The Classical Model
In this section we will replicate the analysis as in Section 3 when the classical assumption is used. To do
this, it is enough to change the structure of the signals distribution as
Pr(tj = i|I) = p and Pr(tj = g|G) = p
Pr(tj = g|I) = 1− p and Pr(tj = i|G) = 1− p
with p ∈ ( 12 , 1) and we assume the independence of the signals. As in Proposition 3.3 it is possible to
deﬁne the interval within a juror is responsive, when she can observe all the signals proﬁle
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Proposition 4.1. For given p ∈ ( 12 , 1) and |T | = 3 an unbiased juror j ∈ J is responsive, if and only if
q ∈ (qmin0 , qmax0 ) = ( (1− p)3p3 + (1− p)3 , p3p3 + (1− p)3
)
Notice that letting p equal to z, this implies that signals have the same quality, the responsiveness interval
in Section 3 is always wider than this one
(
qmin0 , q
max
0
) ⊂ (qminα , qmaxα ). It is suﬃcient to know that with a
positive probability, no matter of its value, Nature reveals the truth to convince more concerned jurors to
react to the information.
Proposition 4.2. Let J be a set of unbiased and responsive jurors with mˆ ∈ N <∞ for given p ∈ ( 12 , 1),
if q ∈ (1− p, p) then the informative voting strategy (proﬁle) is rational. That is, for any q ∈ (1− p, p) the
informative voting strategy proﬁle σ∗ is a bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γb0.
where Γb0 = 〈J, (Tj , Sj)j∈J , (p, pi), v〉 is the modiﬁed bayesian game. When q /∈ (1 − p, p) the threshold of
reasonable doubt is shifted and so
Proposition 4.3. Let J be a set of unbiased and responsive jurors with |J | = 3, for given p ∈ ( 12 , 1) and
q ∈ (qˆmin0 , 1− p) the voting strategy
Pr(a|tj = g) = 0
Pr(a|tj = i) = q[p
2 + (1− p)2]− (1− p)2
q[p3 + (1− p)3]− (1− p)3
where
qˆmin0 =
(1− p)2
p2 + (1− p)2 > q
min
0
is rational. That is, for any q ∈ (qˆmin0 , 1− p) the above strategy is a bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γb0.
Similarly to the Proposition 3.5 the lower bound qˆmin0 is higher than q
min
0 and the signal tj is revealed
only when it is consistent with the aptitude of the jurors.
Proposition 4.4. Let J be a set of unbiased and responsive jurors with |J | = 3, for given p ∈ ( 12 , 1) and
q ∈ (p, qˆmax0 ) the voting strategy
Pr(a|tj = g) = qp(1− p)− p
2(1− p)
p3 − q[p3 + (1− p)3]
Pr(a|tj = i) = 1
where
qˆmax0 =
p2
p2 + (1− p)2 < q
max
0
is rational. That is, for any q ∈ (p, qˆmax0 ) the above strategy is a bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γb0.
as Proposition 3.6 the upper bound qˆmax0 is lower than q
max
0 and tj is revealed only when tj = i.
5 Benchmark
Denote as α-model the one described in Section 2 and as 0-model the classic one in Section 4. Now
the two models will be compared under the assumption that the ex ante utilities, obtained adopting the
informative strategy proﬁle, are the same. To do this it is necessary to ﬁnd the relation, if exists, between
the diﬀerent parameters of the models. Before observing the signal
EU[v] = −1
2
[Pr(conv|I) q + Pr(acq|G)(1− q)]
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where the conditioned probabilities of acquit and convict depend also by the voting strategy proﬁle
Pr(conv|I) =
∑
(t−i,ti)∈T
Pr(conv|t−i, ti, I) Pr(t−i, ti|I)
Pr(acq|G) =
∑
(t−i,ti)∈T
Pr(acq|t−i, ti,G) Pr(t−i, ti|G)
In both models, under the informative strategy, the ex ante expected utilities does not depend on q
EUα[v] = −1
2
(1− α)[(1− z)3 + 3z(1− z)2]
EU0[v] = −1
2
[(1− p)3 + 3p(1− p)2]
In this case EUα[v] is equal to EU0[v] if and only if between α, z and p holds this relation
−1
2
(1− α)[(1− z)3 + 3z(1− z)2] = −1
2
[(1− p)3 + 3p(1− p)2] (?)
derived in the Appendix. When α = 0 both models coincide and p = z as when α = 1 or z = 1, in all
other cases p > z.
Example 5.1. For α = 0.5 and z = 0.65 the ex ante expected utility is EUα[v] = −0.0704 and the
probability p that satisﬁes equation (?) is 0.7639.
Let qˆmin = min{qˆmin0 , qˆminα } and qˆmax = max{qˆmax0 , qˆmaxα }. When q < qˆmin in both models jurors always
chooses to convict and the ex ante expected utilities are
EUα[v] = EU0[v] = −1
2
q
when q > qˆmax in both models jurors always chooses to acquit and the ex ante expected utilities are
EUα[v] = EU0[v] = −1
2
(1− q)
The following proposition determines the intervals of the two models.
Proposition 5.2. For given α ∈ ( 12 , 1), z ∈ ( 12 , 1) and p ∈ ( 12 , 1) such that equation (?) holds,
qˆmin = qˆminα (qˆ
min = qˆmin0 ) and qˆ
max = qˆmaxα (qˆ
max = qˆmax0 )
if and only if
α > (<) αˆ
with
αˆ =
p2(1− z)2 − (1− p)2z2
(1− p)2 + p2(1− z)2 − (1− p)2z2
Since α ∈ (0, 1) can be viewed as the probability of observing a straightforward evidence that leaves no
doubt, it is natural that higher values of this parameter implies a wider interval of responsiveness of the
jurors. Now it is time to compare the ex ante expected utilities for some values of q.
Proposition 5.3. Let J be a set of unbiased and responsive jurors with |J | = 3, for given α ∈ (0, 1),
z ∈ ( 12 , 1) and p ∈ ( 12 , 1) such that equation (?) holds,
i) if q ∈ (0, qˆmin) in both models jurors always choose to convict and EUα[v] = EU0[v].
ii) if q ∈ (1 − p, 1 − z) in the 0−model the informative strategy is rational, while in the α-model is
rational the strategy described in proposition 3.5 and EUα[v] > EU0[v].
iii) if q ∈ (1− z, z) in both models the informative strategy is rational and EUα[v] = EU0[v].
iv) if q ∈ (z, p) in the 0−model the informative strategy is rational, while in the α-model is rational the
strategy described in proposition 3.6 and EUα[v] > EU0[v].
v) if q ∈ (qˆmax, 1) in both models jurors always choose to acquit and EUα[v] = EU0[v].
9
6 Conclusions
The presence of a positive probability with which Nature reveals the true state of the world, makes the
responsiveness interval wider. It is easy to see that when the number of jurors increases the values of qminα
and qmin0 approach to zero and the values of q
max
α and q
max
0 approach to one. The reason is very simple:
the more information a single decision maker can observe and the higher is her inclination to change
her judgment about the defendant. On the other hand, when the number of jury members increases the
probability of being pivotal decreases. This eﬀect should narrow the intervals (qˆminα , 1 − z), (qˆmin0 , 1 − z),
(z, qˆmaxα ) and (p, qˆ
max
0 ). A possible extension of the model described in Section 2 is the introduction of
a public observable signal with state dependent distribution. It can be interpreted as the role played by
opinion leaders or by the media, i.e. television, newspapers, Internet forums, etc. In this case, it seems
reasonable that the quality of the signal should be lower with respect to the signals produced during the
trial. Another possible extension is the introduction of diﬀerent thresholds of reasonable doubt (as in
Gerardi, 2000). In this framework does a heterogeneous jury performs better than a homogeneous one?
7 Appendix
Probabilistic Structure
Let N = |J |, the distribution of the signals proﬁles t = (t1, . . . , tN ) ∈ {i, g}N is deﬁned as
f(t) = 10(t) · p(0, N) + 1k(t) · p(k,N) + 1N (t) · p(N,N)
where 10(t) is the indicator function of the zero vector,
1k(t) =
{
1 if
∑N
j=1 tj = k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N − 1}
0 otherwise
and 1N (t) is the indicator function of the vector with all components equal to 1. The corresponding
probabilities are
p(0, N) = (1− pi)α+ (1− α)[pi(1− z)N + (1− pi)zN ]
p(k,N) = (1− α)[pizk(1− z)N−k + (1− pi)zN−k(1− z)k]
p(N,N) = αpi + (1− α)[pizN + (1− pi)(1− z)N ]
and the sum of the signals for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N − 1} is distribuited as
g(k) =
(
N
j
)N−1
j=k
pi(1− α)zj(1− z)N−j + (1− pi)(1− α)zN−j(1− z)j
for k = 0
g(0) = pi(1− α)(1− z)N + (1− pi)[α+ (1− α)zN ]
and for k = N
g(N) = pi[α+ (1− α)zN ] + (1− pi)(1− α)(1− z)N
Explicitation of Condition (?)
Conditions (?) holds if and only if between α ∈ (0, 1), z ∈ ( 12 , 1) and p ∈ ( 12 , 1) holds this relation
p =
1
2
− sin
(
arcsin(2(1− α)[(1− z)3 + 3z(1− z)2]− 1)
3
)
∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
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where
arcsin(·) : [−1, 1]→
[
−pi
2
,
pi
2
]
is the inverse function of the sin(·). This is the only admissible solution of the third degree equation
derived by condition (?). Table 1 reports some values of p for given α and z.
α
0.000 0.100 0.300 0.500 0.700 0.900 1.000
z
0.550 0.550 0.579 0.638 0.703 0.776 0.876 1.000
0.600 0.600 0.625 0.676 0.733 0.798 0.887 1.000
0.650 0.650 0.671 0.715 0.764 0.821 0.900 1.000
0.700 0.700 0.717 0.755 0.796 0.845 0.913 1.000
0.750 0.750 0.764 0.794 0.829 0.869 0.926 1.000
0.800 0.800 0.811 0.835 0.862 0.894 0.940 1.000
0.850 0.850 0.858 0.876 0.896 0.920 0.954 1.000
0.900 0.900 0.905 0.917 0.930 0.946 0.969 1.000
0.950 0.950 0.953 0.958 0.965 0.973 0.984 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 1: Values of p for ﬁxed z and α.
Proofs
Proof of Corollary 2.5
Trivial.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
(if part) Fix α ∈ (0, 1), z ∈ ( 12 , 1) and take an unbiased juror with q ∈ (qminα , qmaxα ). Without loss of
generality take the signals proﬁles t1 = (g, g, g) and t2 = (i, i, i). Since she observes all the signals the
probability of being pivotal is one and so she compares her q with these two probabilities
Pr(G| t1 = (g, g, g)) = α+ (1− α)z
3
α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]
Pr(G| t2 = (i, i, i)) = (1− α)(1− z)
3
α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]
it results that Pr(G| t2) < q < Pr(G| t1) and so she chooses to convict the defendant after observing t1
and acquit him after observing t2. If there exist a signal proﬁle tˆ ∈ T such that Pr(G|tˆ) = q then the juror
chooses to randomize her choice.
(only if) Let's assume that q < qminα and suppose that the juror is responsive. It is easy to see that for any
signals proﬁles t ∈ T the parameter q is smaller than Pr(G|t) and so the juror always chooses to convict the
defendant, independently by the signals proﬁle and so she is not responsive. For q > qmaxα the reasoning
is similar.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Under the assumptions of the proposition and after making simple calculations it results that
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = z and Pr(G|piv, tj = i) = 1− z
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for any mˆ <∞. This means that for q ∈ (1− z, z)
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = z > q > 1− z = Pr(G|piv, tj = i)
and so for any q ∈ (1− z, z) the informative strategy is a symmetric bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.5
The proof is by construction, for each j ∈ J let's consider the symmetric strategy{
if tj = g then c
if tj = i then σj ∈ ∆(Sj)
(1)
where σj = Pr(a|tj = i). After observing tj = i the juror chooses to randomize if and only if she is
indiﬀerent, that is, if Pr(G|piv, tj = i) = q. So if
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) > q = Pr(G|piv, tj = i)
this strategy is an equilibrium. Under the strategy described in (1)
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = 1− σj(1− z)
2− σj
and
Pr(G|piv, tj = i) = (1− α)(1− z)
2 − σj(1− α)(1− z)3
α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2]− σj [α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]]
since σj ∈ (0, 1), it results that
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) ∈
(
1
2
, z
)
(2)
Moreover it must be
Pr(G|piv, ti = i) = (1− α)(1− z)
2 − σj(1− α)(1− z)3
α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2]− σj [α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]] = q
Now consider the equality
σj =
(1− α)(1− z)2 − q[α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2]]
(1− α)(1− z)3 − q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]] (3)
since σj is positive, it could be{
(1− α)(1− z)2 − q[α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2]] > 0
(1− α)(1− z)3 − q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]] > 0 (A)
or {
(1− α)(1− z)2 − q[α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2]] < 0
(1− α)(1− z)3 − q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]] < 0 (B)
Case A
Let's consider case (A), it means that q must satisfy both these inequalities
q <
(1− α)(1− z)2
α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2]
q <
(1− α)(1− z)3
α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]
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but since for any α ∈ (0, 1)
1 >
(1− α)(1− z)2
α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2] >
(1− α)(1− z)3
α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3] > 0
we can restrict our attention to
q <
(1− α)(1− z)3
α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3] (4)
moreover it must be
σj =
(1− α)(1− z)2 − q[α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2]]
(1− α)(1− z)3 − q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]] < 1
and this inequality is satisﬁed for
q > (1− z) (5)
So q must satisfy both (4) and (5) in order to have σj ∈ (0, 1)
(1− z) < q < (1− α)(1− z)
3
α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3] (6)
and this is possibile if and only if
α+ (1− α)z(2z − 1) < 0
but α ∈ (0, 1) and (2z − 1) > 0 so case (A) must be discarded.
Case B
Let's consider case (B), it means that q must satisfy both these inequalities
q >
(1− α)(1− z)2
α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2]
q >
(1− α)(1− z)3
α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]
but since for any α ∈ (0, 1)
1 >
(1− α)(1− z)2
α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2] >
(1− α)(1− z)3
α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3] > 0
we can restrict out attention to
q >
(1− α)(1− z)2
α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2] (7)
moreover it must be
σj =
q[α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2]]− (1− α)(1− z)2
q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]]− (1− α)(1− z)3 < 1
and this inequality is satisﬁed for
q < (1− z) (8)
So q must satisfy both (7) and (8) in order to have σj ∈ (0, 1)
(1− α)(1− z)2
α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2] < q < (1− z) (9)
and this is possibile if and only if
α+ (1− α)z(2z − 1) > 0
since α ∈ (0, 1) and (2z − 1) > 0, it is always true. From (2) and (8) the strategy (1) is feasible for any
q ∈
(
(1− α)(1− z)2
α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2] , 1− z
)
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and for any q in the interval
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) > q
and
Pr(G|piv, tj = i) = q
Proof of Proposition 3.6
The proof is by construction, for each j ∈ J let's consider the symmetric strategy{
if tj = g then σj ∈ ∆(Sj)
if tj = i then a
(10)
where σj = Pr(a|tj = g). After observing tj = g the juror chooses to randomize if and only if she is
indiﬀerent, that is, Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = q. So if
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = q > Pr(G|piv, tj = i)
the strategy is an equilibrium. Under the strategy described in (10)
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = (1− α)z
2(1− z) + σj [α+ (1− α)z3]
(1− α)z(1− z) + σj [α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]]
and
Pr(G|piv, tj = i) = (1− z) + σjz
1 + σj
since σj ∈ (0, 1), it results that
Pr(G|piv, tj = i) ∈
(
1− z, 1
2
)
(11)
Moreover it must be
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = (1− α)z
2(1− z) + σj [α+ (1− α)z3]
(1− α)z(1− z) + σj [α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]] = q
Now consider the equality
σj =
(1− α)z2(1− z)− q(1− α)z(1− z)
q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]]− [α+ (1− α)z3] (12)
since σj is positive, it could be{
(1− α)z2(1− z)− q(1− α)z(1− z) > 0
q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]]− [α+ (1− α)z3] > 0 (A)
or {
(1− α)z2(1− z)− q(1− α)z(1− z) < 0
q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]]− [α+ (1− α)z3] < 0 (B)
Case A
Let's consider case (A), it means that q must satisfy both these inequalities
α+ (1− α)z3
α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3] < q < z
but since for any α ∈ (0, 1)
z <
α+ (1− α)z3
α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]
case (A) must be discarded.
14
Case B
Let's consider case (B), it means that q must satisfy both these inequalities
z < q <
α+ (1− α)z3
α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]
and for any value of α ∈ (0, 1)
z <
α+ (1− α)z3
α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]
moreover it must be
σj =
q(1− α)z(1− z)− (1− α)z2(1− z)2
α+ (1− α)z3 − q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]] < 1
and this means that
z < q <
α+ (1− α)z2
α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2 (13)
for all α ∈ (0, 1) it results
z <
α+ (1− α)z2
α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2] <
α+ (1− α)z3
α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]
from (11) and (13) the strategy (10) is feasible for any
q ∈
(
z,
α+ (1− α)z2
α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2]
)
and for any q in the interval
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = q
and
Pr(G|piv, tj = i) < q
Proof of Proposition 3.7
Under the informative strategy the probability of convict an innocent is
Pr(conv|I) = (1− α)
mˆ∑
x=0
(
2mˆ+ 1
x
)
zx(1− z)(2mˆ+1)−x︸ ︷︷ ︸
the minority of signals are i
(14)
and the probability of acquit a guilty is
Pr(acq|G) = (1− α)
mˆ∑
x=0
(
2mˆ+ 1
x
)
zx(1− z)(2mˆ+1)−x︸ ︷︷ ︸
the minority of signals are g
(15)
Notice that
mˆ∑
x=0
(
2mˆ+ 1
x
)
zx(1− z)(2mˆ+1)−x = 1−
2mˆ+1∑
x=mˆ+1
(
2mˆ+ 1
x
)
zx(1− z)(2mˆ+1)−x
so
Pr(conv|I) = (1− α)
[
1−
2mˆ+1∑
x=mˆ+1
(
2mˆ+ 1
x
)
zx(1− z)(2mˆ+1)−x
]
(16)
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and
Pr(acq|G) = (1− α)
[
1−
2mˆ+1∑
x=mˆ+1
(
2mˆ+ 1
x
)
zx(1− z)(2mˆ+1)−x
]
(17)
from Theorem 1 in Boland (1989) it results that
lim
|J|→∞
Pr(conv|I) = 0 and lim
|J|→∞
Pr(acq|G) = 0
Proof of Proposition 4.1
(if part) Fix p ∈ ( 12 , 1) and take an unbiased juror with q ∈ (qmin0 , qmax0 ). Without loss of generality take
the signals proﬁles t1 = (g, g, g) and t2 = (i, i, i). Since she observes all the signals the probability of being
pivotal is one and so she compares her q with these two probabilities
Pr(G| t1 = (g, g, g)) = p
3
p3 + (1− p)3
Pr(G| t2 = (i, i, i)) = (1− p)
3
p3 + (1− p)3
it results that Pr(G| t2) < q < Pr(G| t1) and so she chooses to convict the defendant after observing t1
and acquit him after observing t2. If there exist a signal proﬁle tˆ ∈ T such that Pr(G|tˆ) = q then the juror
chooses to randomize her choice.
(only if) Let's assume that q < qmin0 and suppose that the juror is responsive. It is easy to see that for any
signals proﬁles t ∈ T the parameter q is smaller than Pr(G|t) and so the juror always chooses to convict the
defendant, independently by the signals proﬁle and so she is not responsive. For q > qmax0 the reasoning
is similar.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
Under the assumptions of the proposition and making simple calculations it results that
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = p and Pr(G|piv, tj = i) = 1− p
for any mˆ <∞. This means that for q ∈ (1− p, p)
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = p > q > 1− p = Pr(G|piv, tj = i)
so for any q ∈ (1− p, p) the informative strategy is a symmetric bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
The proof is by construction, for each j ∈ J let's consider the strategy{
if tj = g then c
if tj = i then σj ∈ ∆(Sj)
(18)
where σj = Pr(a|tj = i). After observing tj = i the juror chooses to randomize if and only if she is
indiﬀerent, that is, Pr(G|piv, tj = i) = q. So if
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) > q = Pr(G|piv, tj = i)
this strategy is an equilibrium. Under the strategy described in (18)
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = 1− (1− p)σj
2− σj
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and
Pr(G|piv, tj = i) = (1− p)
2 − σj(1− p)3
[p2 + (1− p)2]− σj [p3 + (1− p)3]
since σj ∈ (0, 1), it results that
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) ∈
(
1
2
, p
)
(19)
Moreover it must be
Pr(G|piv, tj = i) = (1− p)
2 − σj(1− p)3
[p2 + (1− p)2]− σj [p3 + (1− p)3] = q
Now consider the equality
σj =
(1− p)2 − q[p2 + (1− p)2]
(1− p)3 − q[p3 + (1− p)3] (20)
since σj is positive, it could be {
(1− p)2 − q[p2 + (1− p)2] > 0
(1− p)3 − q[p3 + (1− p)3] > 0 (A)
or {
(1− p)2 − q[p2 + (1− p)2] < 0
(1− p)3 − q[p3 + (1− p)3] < 0 (B)
Case A
Let's consider case (A), it means that q must satisfy both these inequalities
q <
(1− p)3
p3 + (1− p)3
q <
(1− p)2
p2 + (1− p)2
but since for any p ∈ ( 12 , 1)
1 >
(1− p)2
p2 + (1− p)2 >
(1− p)3
p3 + (1− p)3 > 0
we can restrict our attention to
q <
(1− p)3
p3 + (1− p)3 (21)
moreover it must be
σj =
(1− p)2 − q[p2 + (1− p)2]
(1− p)3 − q[p3 + (1− p)3] < 1
and this inequality is satisﬁed for
q > (1− p) (22)
So q must satisfy both (21) and (22) in order to have σj ∈ (0, 1) and this is possibile if and only if
p(1− 2p) > 0
but (1− 2p) < 0 so case (A) must be discarded.
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Case B
Let's consider case (B), it means that q must satisfy both these inequalities
q >
(1− p)3
p3 + (1− p)3
q >
(1− p)2
p2 + (1− p)2
but since for any p ∈ ( 12 , 1)
1 >
(1− p)2
p2 + (1− p)2 >
(1− p)3
p3 + (1− p)3 > 0
we can restrict our attention to
q >
(1− p)2
p2 + (1− p)2 (23)
moreover it must be
σj =
q[p2 + (1− p)2]− (1− p)2
q[p3 + (1− p)3]− (1− p)3 < 1
and this inequality is satisﬁed for
q < (1− p) (24)
So q must satisfy both (23) and (24) in order to have σj ∈ (0, 1)
(1− p)2
p2 + (1− p)2 < q < (1− p) (25)
and this is possible if and only if
p(2p− 1) > 0
since (2p− 1) > 0, it is always true. From (19) and (24) the strategy (18) is feasible for any
q ∈
(
(1− p)2
p2 + (1− p)2 , 1− p
)
and for any q in the interval
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) > q
and
Pr(G|piv, tj = i) = q
Proof of Proposition 4.4
The proof is by construction, for each j ∈ J let's consider the symmetric strategy{
if tj = g then σj ∈ ∆(Sj)
if tj = i then a
(26)
where σj = Pr(a|tj = g). After observing tj = g the juror chooses to randomize if and only if she is
indiﬀerent, that is, Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = q. So if
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = q > Pr(G|piv, tj = i)
the strategy is an equilibrium. Under the strategy described in (26)
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = σjp
3 + p2(1− p)
σj [p3 + (1− p)3] + p(1− p)
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and
Pr(G|piv, tj = i) = (1− p) + σjp
1 + σj
since σj ∈ (0, 1), it results that
Pr(G|piv, tj = i) ∈
(
1− p, 1
2
)
(27)
Moreover it must be
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = σjp
3 + p2(1− p)
σj [p3 + (1− p)3] + p(1− p) = q
Now consider the equality
σj =
p2(1− p)− qp(1− p)
q[p3 + (1− p)3]− p3 (28)
since σj is positive, it could be {
p2(1− p)− qp(1− p) > 0
q[p3 + (1− p)3]− p3 > 0 (A)
or {
p2(1− p)− qp(1− p) < 0
q[p3 + (1− p)3]− p3 < 0 (B)
Case A
Let's consider case (A), it means that q must satisfy both these inequalities
p3
p3 + (1− p)3 < q < p
but since for any p ∈ ( 12 , 1)
p <
p3
p3 + (1− p)3
case (A) must be discarded.
Case B
Let's consider case (B), it means that q must satisfy both these inequalities
p < q <
p3
p3 + (1− p)3 (29)
and for any value of p ∈ ( 12 , 1)
p <
p3
p3 + (1− p)3
moreover it must be
σj =
qp(1− p)− p2(1− p)
p3 − q[p3 + (1− p)3] < 1
and this means that
p < q <
p2
p2 + (1− p)2 (30)
for all p ∈ ( 12 , 1) it results
p <
p2
p2 + (1− p)2 <
p3
p3 + (1− p)3
from (27) and (30) the strategy (26) is feasible for any
q ∈
(
p,
p2
p2 + (1− p)2
)
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and for any q in the interval
Pr(G|piv, tj = g) = q
and
Pr(G|piv, tj = i) < q
Proof of Proposition 5.2
Take in consideration this system of inequalities{
qˆminα < qˆ
min
0
qˆmaxα > qˆ
max
0
that is
(1− α)(1− z)2
α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2] <
(1− p)2
p2 + (1− p)2 (31)
and
α+ (1− α)z2
α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2] >
p2
p2 + (1− p)2 (32)
notice that
(1− p)2z2 < (1− z)2z2 < (1− z)2p2
and so for
αˆ >
p2(1− z)2 − (1− p)2z2
(1− p)2 + p2(1− z)2 − (1− p)2z2
both (31) and (32) hold.
Proof of Proposition 5.3
Consider the following intervals
0 qˆmin 1− z z1− p qˆmaxp 1
i) for q ∈ (0, qˆmin), trivial.
ii) for q ∈ (1 − p, 1 − z), in the α-model jurors use the equilibrium stategy described in proposition 3.5
with
σ∗α = Pr(a|tj = i) =
q[α+ (1− α)[z2 + (1− z)2]]− (1− α)(1− z)2
q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]]− (1− α)(1− z)3 < 1
while in the 0-model the informative strategy is still an equilibrium. So
EUα[v] = −1
2
(1− α)[(1− z)3 + 3z(1− z)2]
−1
2
[(1− σ∗α)3 + 3σ∗α(1− σ∗α)2][q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]]− (1− α)(1− z)3]
+
3
2
[(1− σ∗α)2 + 2σ∗α(1− σ∗α)](1− α)[(1− z)− q]z(1− z)
EU0[v] = −1
2
[(1− p)3 + 3p(1− p)2] = −1
2
(1− α)[(1− z)3 + 3z(1− z)2]
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notice that
(1− σ∗α) =
(1− α)[(1− z)− q]z(1− z)
q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]]− (1− α)(1− z)3
let's call
θ2 = (1− α)[(1− z)− q]z(1− z) > 0
θ1 = q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]]− (1− α)(1− z)3 > 0
then
(1− σ∗α) =
θ2
θ1
and θ2 = (1− σ∗α) θ1
EUα[v] = −1
2
(1− α)[(1− z)3 + 3z(1− z)2]
−1
2
[(1− σ∗α)3 + 3σ∗α(1− σ∗α)2] θ1
+
3
2
[(1− σ∗α)2 + 2σ∗α(1− σ∗α)](1− σ∗α) θ1
and so
EUα[v] = −1
2
(1− α) [(1− z)3 + 3z(1− z)2]+ [(1− σ∗α)3 + 32σ∗α(1− σ∗α)2
]
θ1
since condition (?) holds, it results
EUα[v] = −1
2
(1− α) [(1− z)3 + 3z(1− z)2]+ [(1− σ∗α)3 + 32σ∗α(1− σ∗α)2
]
θ1
= −1
2
[(1− p)3 + 3p(1− p)2] +
[
(1− σ∗α)3 +
3
2
σ∗α(1− σ∗α)2
]
θ1
= EU0[v] +
[
(1− σ∗α)3 +
3
2
σ∗α(1− σ∗α)2
]
θ1
and then EUα[v] > EUα[0].
iii) for q ∈ (1 − z, z), since 1 − p < 1 − z < q < z < p in both models the informative strategy is an
equilibrium, since condition (?) holds, this equality also holds
EUα[v] = −1
2
(1− α)[(1− z)3 + 3z(1− z)2] = −1
2
[(1− p)3 + 3p(1− p)2] = EU0[v]
iv) for q ∈ (z, p), in the α-model jurors use the equilibrium strategy described in proposition 3.6 with
σ∗α = Pr(a|tj = g) =
(1− α)(q − z)z(1− z)
α+ (1− α)z3 − q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]] < 1
while in the 0-model the informative strategy is still an equilibrium. So
EUα[v] = −1
2
(1− α)[(1− z)3 + 3z(1− z)2]
−1
2
[(1− σ∗α)3 + 3σ∗α(1− σ∗α)2][α+ (1− α)z3 − q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]]
+
3
2
[σ∗2α + 2σ
∗
α(1− σ∗α)](1− α)(q − z)z(1− z)
EU0[v] = −1
2
[(1− p)3 + 3p(1− p)2] = −1
2
(1− α)[(1− z)3 + 3z(1− z)2]
let's call
θ4 = (1− α)(q − z)z(1− z) > 0
θ3 = α+ (1− α)z3 − q[α+ (1− α)[z3 + (1− z)3]] > 0
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then
σ∗α =
θ4
θ3
and θ4 = σ
∗
α θ3
EUα[v] = −1
2
(1− α)[(1− z)3 + 3z(1− z)2]
−1
2
[(1− σ∗α)3 + 3σ∗α(1− σ∗α)2] θ3
+
3
2
[σ∗2α + 2σ
∗
α(1− σ∗α)]σ∗α θ3
and so
EUα[v] = −1
2
(1− α) [(1− z)3 + 3z(1− z)2]+ [σ∗3α + 32σ∗2α (1− σ∗α)
]
θ3
since condition (?) holds, it results
EUα[v] = −1
2
(1− α) [(1− z)3 + 3z(1− z)2]+ [σ∗3α + 32σ∗2α (1− σ∗α)
]
θ3
= −1
2
[
(1− p)3 + 3p(1− p)2]+ [σ∗3α + 32σ∗2α (1− σ∗α)
]
θ3
= EU0[v] +
[
σ∗3α +
3
2
σ∗2α (1− σ∗α)
]
θ3
v) for q ∈ (qˆmax, 1), trivial.
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